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Yanukovych and the Attempted Coup 25.1.2014 15:42
Between 2010-2013, those dissatisfied with Yanukovych waited for the presidential elections. Yanukovych and his inner circle were busy rapidly consolidating business assets and absorbing the media. Ukrainian politics had been clan-based even before Yanukovych, but elections to the Rada and presidential elections remained republican in spirit—meaning there was still a possibility of changing power through elections. Now, however, a significant part of Ukrainian society began to fear that instead of upholding young Ukrainian republican traditions, Yanukovych intended to use his first term to create the conditions for an unchangeable "personalist regime," essentially establishing his own version of "putinism." But these were still only fears and assumptions.
At the end of November, a cooperation document with the EU was to be signed in Vilnius. In the first half of 2013, this "Vilnius process" seemed quite routine. Yanukovych had been dealing with European integration issues even under Yushchenko. Ukrainians viewed the expansion of cooperation with the EU with healthy skepticism. There was no hype or unjustified hope surrounding this Vilnius summit. It was believed that Ukraine would never be included in the European Union, and everything else were simply "roadmaps" stretching into infinity. At best, one could count on visa-free entry (which Russia also claims).
And it is at this point that Yanukovych unexpectedly provoked a severe political crisis. He demonstrated the worst of what he was suspected of. After all, by the standards of Eastern European democracies (as Ukrainians already viewed themselves), making or rejecting strategic decisions about cooperation with the East or West is impossible except through open debates, consultations with the opposition, and referendums—in other words, through all the open political mechanisms for reaching consensus familiar to Europe.
For example: in Ireland, a referendum (2008) first voted "against" joining the eurozone, and a year later, a repeat referendum voted "for." The issue of placing missile defense systems in the Czech Republic and Poland was not put to a referendum, but one was demanded. Meanwhile, parliamentary debates lasted a year, all political parties spoke out, government members held different positions, and they could express them publicly. In Portugal, for instance, the issue of abortion had to be put to a referendum.
In other words, if the President of Ukraine had doubts regarding the course toward European integration and the Vilnius agreement, Ukrainian society expected an open policy on this matter. Instead, Yanukovych carried out a series of closed political actions—negotiations in Beijing and Moscow, and made a number of confusing statements. Thus, he showed that his financial and political assets were already sufficiently consolidated to transition to a closed "personalist regime." At that moment, a significant part of Ukrainian society regardless of where they lived—and not just "Westerners" or "Kyivans"—clearly felt: this is a "betrayal of democracy." This feint by Yanukovych was direct proof that there would be no free elections in 2015.
People took to the Maidan. Between December 1 and 15, there were weak attempts at active action from the opposition. Then they stood peacefully for a long time—over a month—hoping that Yanukovych and his circle would come to their senses and return to an Eastern European format of internal politics. That is, there would be negotiations, debates, and arguments. Instead, Yanukovych locked himself away in Mezhyhirya. He began to demonstrate his intention to "wait it out." This significantly worsened the situation. It convinced both the political opposition and ordinary citizens who disagreed with the "betrayal of democracy" that Yanukovych intended to act like Putin: wait until the energy of the protest dissipated, and then strike society with a series of targeted blows—bribing some, imprisoning others, forcing a third to be silent under pressure or pushing them abroad. Between December 15 and January 15, the situation seemed to freeze. A large series of analytical publications appeared claiming that the Maidan lacked sufficient political tools, had no agenda, and no leaders. Publications also appeared stating that Europe and the USA had stepped back and would not put pressure on Yanukovych.
All this apparently strengthened Yanukovych and his advisors in the belief that the Maidan was becoming "ghettoized," turning inward, and losing the active attention of society. As a result, Yanukovych would be able to ride the wave of "lack of alternatives"—creating a typical situation of transition from a weak democracy to a "personalist regime."
Lack of alternatives is an important term for understanding the mechanisms of forming personalist regimes. In Russia, it was introduced by political philosopher Mikhail Gefter when analyzing the emergence of Stalinism. But it operates not only in authoritarian regimes. A lack of alternatives arises as a result of several factors, both natural and managed. Pitting the opposition against each other, creating an atmosphere of "yes, we are bad, but the next ones will be even worse," inflating the threat of "uncontrollables" coming to power, implicating others in repressions, etc.—the main result of these factors should be a public atmosphere of loyalty to the leader amidst a complete "unimaginability of an alternative." None of those who became leaders of a "personalist dictatorship" were inherently bolder or smarter than their contemporary politicians before its establishment. But many managed to create a situation where competing political groups and their leaders appeared compromised in the eyes of the masses. The political landscape as it were sinks—and against this sinking background, a conditional "Mussolini," "Salazar," or "Stalin" begins to appear as an unchangeable figure, the sole guarantor of all balances. "There is no alternative!"
In January, suspicions that Yanukovych was steering things in this direction grew; there were no actions on his part toward public policy.
And suddenly on January 16, the Party of Regions pushed a package of "anti-extremist documents" through the Rada. This gesture clearly indicated: Yanukovych is following the Putin scenario. He intends to wait it out and then "criminalize" the protest and the opposition. On January 19, well-known Ukrainian journalist and activist Mustafa Nayyem wrote pessimistically in his blog: "In negotiations, Viktor Yanukovych will speak from a position of strength. No compromise should be expected. And do not lose your head: regardless of the result of the negotiations, arrests will begin in the country—cruel and ruthless, without noise or dust. While we were in shock at the new reality, they were working in it and gathering materials for criminal cases.
We must think about how to help those arrested... Staying together and not getting lost is most important right now. Otherwise, society will sooner or later be infected by the virus of fear, which will undermine the protest far more effectively than the Berkut."
Earlier, throughout January, stormy debates on strategy took place on the Maidan and around it: some insisted on "peaceful standing," apparently hoping to lead the Maidan up to the elections. Many observers wrote that no strategy other than a "revolutionary" one—i.e., seizing buildings—would create a real threat to Yanukovych's regime. Others argued that seizure would not help either. Those who opposed the opposition's use of force (seizing buildings and clashes with VV and Berkut) believed that the only real factor for possible success was military units and their commanders switching to the side of the protesters, as well as a public refusal to support Yanukovych by influential business representatives and regional leaders.
On January 19-20, the most mobilized part of the Maidan—right-wingers and football fans—attacked soldiers and "Berkut." Molotov cocktails were used. Security forces had orders exclusively to defend buildings and preserve personnel, but they had no order to counter-attack the assailants. The battle continued for nearly a day using bats, smoke bombs, flashbang grenades, and paving stones. It led to a large number of casualties on both sides. Yanukovych stated that the introduction of the new package of laws would be suspended. The next day, reports appeared that the Rada had declared its readiness to vote for the introduction of a state of emergency, but by evening this report was disavowed.
Yanukovych met with Klitschko and then simulated a "round table with the opposition" without his own participation.
How will all this end? It is impossible not to see that fighting the protesters contains both risks of total loss of control for Yanukovych and, conversely, the strengthening of the "lack of alternatives." The calculation that the more aggressively dissenters behave, the stronger the fear of the passive part of society becomes—may be justified. And in the 2015 elections, Yanukovych will win due to "passive loyalty."
But this is hard to believe. Even political analyst Mikhail Pogrebinsky, who is loyal to Yanukovych, as seen from his interview, sees too many errors in Yanukovych's political management.
The scheme of "abandoning Vilnius," taking Putin's 15 billion, calculating on the forceful suppression of the opposition, and the unwillingness or inability to create a consensus through public political procedures around simultaneous movement toward both the East and West—all this is an extremely crude political style. It shows society too clearly that Yanukovych wants to be "Putin-2." And for Ukrainian society, this says only one thing: one group intends to seize power for many years, abandon the format of Eastern European democracy, bury the "ideals of the republic," and establish a "personalist regime" managing "Corporation Ukraine."
I think Yanukovych could have carried out such a "right-wing coup" in Ukraine. But not at the end of his third year of rule. And—even more so—not on the basis of such a crude plot as abandoning Vilnius and "going under Russia for money." Yanukovych provoked a political crisis of a scale that exceeds his personal capabilities as a politician. In my view, Yanukovych no longer has ways to escape suspicion that he is creating a Putin-style personalist regime that will deprive Ukrainian society of an "alternative" for many years.
Between 2010-2013, those dissatisfied with Yanukovych waited for the presidential elections. Yanukovych and his inner circle were busy rapidly consolidating business assets and absorbing the media. Ukrainian politics had been clan-based even before Yanukovych, but elections to the Rada and presidential elections remained republican in spirit—meaning there was still a possibility of changing power through elections. Now, however, a significant part of Ukrainian society began to fear that instead of upholding young Ukrainian republican traditions, Yanukovych intended to use his first term to create the conditions for an unchangeable "personalist regime," essentially establishing his own version of "putinism." But these were still only fears and assumptions.
At the end of November, a cooperation document with the EU was to be signed in Vilnius. In the first half of 2013, this "Vilnius process" seemed quite routine. Yanukovych had been dealing with European integration issues even under Yushchenko. Ukrainians viewed the expansion of cooperation with the EU with healthy skepticism. There was no hype or unjustified hope surrounding this Vilnius summit. It was believed that Ukraine would never be included in the European Union, and everything else were simply "roadmaps" stretching into infinity. At best, one could count on visa-free entry (which Russia also claims).
And it is at this point that Yanukovych unexpectedly provoked a severe political crisis. He demonstrated the worst of what he was suspected of. After all, by the standards of Eastern European democracies (as Ukrainians already viewed themselves), making or rejecting strategic decisions about cooperation with the East or West is impossible except through open debates, consultations with the opposition, and referendums—in other words, through all the open political mechanisms for reaching consensus familiar to Europe.
For example: in Ireland, a referendum (2008) first voted "against" joining the eurozone, and a year later, a repeat referendum voted "for." The issue of placing missile defense systems in the Czech Republic and Poland was not put to a referendum, but one was demanded. Meanwhile, parliamentary debates lasted a year, all political parties spoke out, government members held different positions, and they could express them publicly. In Portugal, for instance, the issue of abortion had to be put to a referendum.
In other words, if the President of Ukraine had doubts regarding the course toward European integration and the Vilnius agreement, Ukrainian society expected an open policy on this matter. Instead, Yanukovych carried out a series of closed political actions—negotiations in Beijing and Moscow, and made a number of confusing statements. Thus, he showed that his financial and political assets were already sufficiently consolidated to transition to a closed "personalist regime." At that moment, a significant part of Ukrainian society regardless of where they lived—and not just "Westerners" or "Kyivans"—clearly felt: this is a "betrayal of democracy." This feint by Yanukovych was direct proof that there would be no free elections in 2015.
People took to the Maidan. Between December 1 and 15, there were weak attempts at active action from the opposition. Then they stood peacefully for a long time—over a month—hoping that Yanukovych and his circle would come to their senses and return to an Eastern European format of internal politics. That is, there would be negotiations, debates, and arguments. Instead, Yanukovych locked himself away in Mezhyhirya. He began to demonstrate his intention to "wait it out." This significantly worsened the situation. It convinced both the political opposition and ordinary citizens who disagreed with the "betrayal of democracy" that Yanukovych intended to act like Putin: wait until the energy of the protest dissipated, and then strike society with a series of targeted blows—bribing some, imprisoning others, forcing a third to be silent under pressure or pushing them abroad. Between December 15 and January 15, the situation seemed to freeze. A large series of analytical publications appeared claiming that the Maidan lacked sufficient political tools, had no agenda, and no leaders. Publications also appeared stating that Europe and the USA had stepped back and would not put pressure on Yanukovych.
All this apparently strengthened Yanukovych and his advisors in the belief that the Maidan was becoming "ghettoized," turning inward, and losing the active attention of society. As a result, Yanukovych would be able to ride the wave of "lack of alternatives"—creating a typical situation of transition from a weak democracy to a "personalist regime."
Lack of alternatives is an important term for understanding the mechanisms of forming personalist regimes. In Russia, it was introduced by political philosopher Mikhail Gefter when analyzing the emergence of Stalinism. But it operates not only in authoritarian regimes. A lack of alternatives arises as a result of several factors, both natural and managed. Pitting the opposition against each other, creating an atmosphere of "yes, we are bad, but the next ones will be even worse," inflating the threat of "uncontrollables" coming to power, implicating others in repressions, etc.—the main result of these factors should be a public atmosphere of loyalty to the leader amidst a complete "unimaginability of an alternative." None of those who became leaders of a "personalist dictatorship" were inherently bolder or smarter than their contemporary politicians before its establishment. But many managed to create a situation where competing political groups and their leaders appeared compromised in the eyes of the masses. The political landscape as it were sinks—and against this sinking background, a conditional "Mussolini," "Salazar," or "Stalin" begins to appear as an unchangeable figure, the sole guarantor of all balances. "There is no alternative!"
In January, suspicions that Yanukovych was steering things in this direction grew; there were no actions on his part toward public policy.
And suddenly on January 16, the Party of Regions pushed a package of "anti-extremist documents" through the Rada. This gesture clearly indicated: Yanukovych is following the Putin scenario. He intends to wait it out and then "criminalize" the protest and the opposition. On January 19, well-known Ukrainian journalist and activist Mustafa Nayyem wrote pessimistically in his blog: "In negotiations, Viktor Yanukovych will speak from a position of strength. No compromise should be expected. And do not lose your head: regardless of the result of the negotiations, arrests will begin in the country—cruel and ruthless, without noise or dust. While we were in shock at the new reality, they were working in it and gathering materials for criminal cases.
We must think about how to help those arrested... Staying together and not getting lost is most important right now. Otherwise, society will sooner or later be infected by the virus of fear, which will undermine the protest far more effectively than the Berkut."
Earlier, throughout January, stormy debates on strategy took place on the Maidan and around it: some insisted on "peaceful standing," apparently hoping to lead the Maidan up to the elections. Many observers wrote that no strategy other than a "revolutionary" one—i.e., seizing buildings—would create a real threat to Yanukovych's regime. Others argued that seizure would not help either. Those who opposed the opposition's use of force (seizing buildings and clashes with VV and Berkut) believed that the only real factor for possible success was military units and their commanders switching to the side of the protesters, as well as a public refusal to support Yanukovych by influential business representatives and regional leaders.
On January 19-20, the most mobilized part of the Maidan—right-wingers and football fans—attacked soldiers and "Berkut." Molotov cocktails were used. Security forces had orders exclusively to defend buildings and preserve personnel, but they had no order to counter-attack the assailants. The battle continued for nearly a day using bats, smoke bombs, flashbang grenades, and paving stones. It led to a large number of casualties on both sides. Yanukovych stated that the introduction of the new package of laws would be suspended. The next day, reports appeared that the Rada had declared its readiness to vote for the introduction of a state of emergency, but by evening this report was disavowed.
Yanukovych met with Klitschko and then simulated a "round table with the opposition" without his own participation.
How will all this end? It is impossible not to see that fighting the protesters contains both risks of total loss of control for Yanukovych and, conversely, the strengthening of the "lack of alternatives." The calculation that the more aggressively dissenters behave, the stronger the fear of the passive part of society becomes—may be justified. And in the 2015 elections, Yanukovych will win due to "passive loyalty."
But this is hard to believe. Even political analyst Mikhail Pogrebinsky, who is loyal to Yanukovych, as seen from his interview, sees too many errors in Yanukovych's political management.
The scheme of "abandoning Vilnius," taking Putin's 15 billion, calculating on the forceful suppression of the opposition, and the unwillingness or inability to create a consensus through public political procedures around simultaneous movement toward both the East and West—all this is an extremely crude political style. It shows society too clearly that Yanukovych wants to be "Putin-2." And for Ukrainian society, this says only one thing: one group intends to seize power for many years, abandon the format of Eastern European democracy, bury the "ideals of the republic," and establish a "personalist regime" managing "Corporation Ukraine."
I think Yanukovych could have carried out such a "right-wing coup" in Ukraine. But not at the end of his third year of rule. And—even more so—not on the basis of such a crude plot as abandoning Vilnius and "going under Russia for money." Yanukovych provoked a political crisis of a scale that exceeds his personal capabilities as a politician. In my view, Yanukovych no longer has ways to escape suspicion that he is creating a Putin-style personalist regime that will deprive Ukrainian society of an "alternative" for many years.
Весна 2013.
